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Abstract—Malware attacks represent a significant part of
today’s security threats. Software guard extensions (SGX) are
a set of hardware instructions introduced by Intel in their recent
lines of processors that are intended to provide a secure execution
environment for user-developed applications. To our knowledge,
there was no serious attempt yet to overcome the SGX protection
by leveraging the software supply chain infrastructure, such as
weaknesses in the development, build or signing servers. While
SGX protection does not specifically take into consideration
such threats, we show in the current paper that a simple
malware attack exploiting a separation between the build and
signing processes can have a serious damaging impact, practically
nullifying the SGX integrity protection measures. Finally, we also
suggest some possible mitigations against the attack.
Index Terms—security, dependable software, supply chain,
malware, SGX.
I. INTRODUCTION
A software supply chain attack can be informally defined
as the act of compromising legit software packages during
their development or distribution phases. The number of
such attacks showed a tremendous increase over the last few
years, including high impact ones. A recent NIST forum
presentation [1] reported seven significant events in 2017
compared to only four during the previous three years. One
of the most common attack vectors is injecting malicious
malware code [1], [2] into legitimate software packages during
or between development and distribution phases, such as
upon building or signing. The most prominent example is an
infected installation package of the well known CCleaner [3]
application that included a malware deployed in the vendor’s
build server [4]. The altered binary file was downloaded by
2.27 million customers, with potentially serious effects ranging
from keystrokes recording to stealing secret credentials from
users.
There are also other recent documented examples of fairly
similar supply chain attacks, such as an embedded malware in
software packages released by NetSarang [5], a company that
develops secure connectivity solutions, or corrupted packages
injected with malicious code used for updates on M.E.Doc [6],
a highly popular accounting application suite in Ukraine. The
focus of our paper lies on the severe implications in a supply
chain attack scenario against one of the most recent approaches
of preserving confidentiality and integrity of applications: Intel
SGX.
SGX [7] is a set of instruction extensions introduced by
Intel in their line of commodity processors since the Skylake
generation in 2015. SGX offers developers the benefit of a
trusted execution environment (TEE) supported in hardware
for critical applications or parts of applications requiring
enhanced security levels. The TEE can be used as an isolated
space for executing code in enclave containers where confi-
dentiality and integrity are assured. The integrity of a software
application that is supposed to run in an isolated enclave is
determined based on a measurement that uniquely identifies
the software code inside the container [7]. This measurement
is computed as a hash when the enclave is initiated. Based on
this value, an attestation procedure can be performed whenever
a third party wants to check if the correct code is actually
running in a SGX-capable machine. This check implies that
each time the enclave is loaded for execution, the measurement
is re-calculated and compared for integrity against the initial
value, obtained at signing time. If any steps of the enclave
building process are altered, resulting in alterations of the
loaded code and data, this integrity check will fail.
Due to the execution in a guaranteed isolated secure en-
vironment, the SGX enclave integrity provisioning is a very
attractive countermeasure against previously described supply
chain attacks. If a critical software application is loaded within
a secure enclave, its alteration through malware embedding
could be easily detected as part of the attestation process. Un-
fortunately, as we prove in our paper, an attacker can currently
circumvent the SGX integrity protection using a particular
attack methodology that implies injecting the malware between
the time of building the target software binary and its signing
phase that prepares it for the attestation.
Although, in some light, the attack we show can be regarded
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as generic, since it is applicable to any software package that
is vulnerable to tampering before applying a secure signature,
the case we present has particular severe implications on the
attempt to protect integrity using SGX. The attack targets
the SGX signing process and renders useless its enclave
measurement in the way this is initially computed, as well
as all its subsequent verifications. As a result, this means that
developers and users cannot blindly trust SGX in itself as a
way to protect their code and data, unless the signing process
that includes the enclave measurement has been conducted in
secure environment. To counter the attack we propose securing
this measurement at the enclave compilation phase. We also
advocate towards some variants for a secure topology that
would bring real benefit in using SGX for protecting software
integrity.
In Section II we provide details over the measurement
mechanism and the way this is currently used in verifying
the integrity of an enclave. Section III describes the actual
attack scenario, pointing out current vulnerabilities. Section IV
provides some practical details regarding the effective attack
implementation. Section V discusses possible ways of mitigat-
ing the attack. In Section VI we provide a brief overview of
related work and we conclude in Section VII.
II. SGX BACKGROUND
SGX has been available as a TEE in Intel processors since
the Skylake family. It was intended to allow applications
to safely handle sensitive data when running within secure
enclaves against an attacker who has full control of the
operating system (OS). The security boundary is the central
processing unit (CPU) die, where data is available in plaintext
form. Outside it, enclaves’ data are always encrypted and their
respective digests are kept for integrity and freshness checks.
One SGX application is formed by the combination of two
logical components: trusted and untrusted. Untrusted code runs
in user mode, it is responsible for asking the operating system
to allocate enclave memory and is able to perform enclave
calls (ecalls) through a special instruction, but it does not have
access to enclave memory pages. Trusted code, on the other
hand, is able to access both its own pages and the ones that
belong to the same process running in untrusted mode. Since
the OS is not part of the trusted computing base (TCB), the
enclave is not able to directly perform system calls, and it
can only execute these through outside calls (ocalls). Since
trusted code deals with sensitive data, it is signed and can be
attested by local or remote parties before being provisioned
with secrets.
The development of applications targeted to run within
SGX enclaves, besides the usual iterations on coding and
compiling, also includes a mandatory signing step before the
executables are able to be deployed and used in production.
This serves two essential purposes: (i) the code is uniquely
associated to independent software vendors (ISVs), making
them accountable for any consequence originated from their
product; and (ii) whoever communicates with the application
can have guarantees that the enclaved endpoint has loaded and
is actually running the expected code within a genuine SGX
platform.
Intel offers to ISVs two signing methods [8]: (i) single-step
method, for development or pre-release modes, which uses
a test private key locally stored in the building system; and
(ii) two-step method, for release enclaves made by ISVs who
have obtained a production license from Intel [9]. With the
two-step method, the ISVs first generate the signing material,
which is later signed in a different facility that has access to
the signing key. Then, the signature comes back to the building
platform and is appended to the enclave’s metadata. Figure 1
illustrates the two-step method.
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Fig. 1. Two-step signing method
The signing material includes information about the vendor,
the date, some attributes, a version number and, especially
important to our attack, the enclave measurement hash. This
hash corresponds to a digest made upon the enclave’s initial
state, including data, code and metadata [7]. When the enclave
is loaded, a hardware implementation of the same procedure
performs a measurement on the actual content of the running
enclave, which has to precisely match the one that was
computed during the signing step. Tamper attempts would be
detectable by this protection scheme. Our attack, however, acts
before the signing material is generated and therefore passes
undetectable by the measurement comparison.
Later on, when interlocutors want to communicate with
a running enclave, they should first attest it before sharing
sensitive data with it. Enclave attestation can be performed
locally or remotely, the latter being dependent on the first.
The attestation procedure starts locally through a previously
established communication channel, when the attestor—which
is a platform enclave in case of a remote attestation—sends its
identity (measurement) to the enclave being attested. This, in
turn, calls a special report instruction that cryptographically
binds the enclave measurement with other security-related
information. This report’s signature can only be checked
locally by another enclave, as it is generated with a hidden
key embedded in the platform. In case of remote attestation,
another report called quote must be generated. This quote, in
turn, may be checked by the remote party with the aid of Intel
attestation service (IAS). Since all this happens after our attack
has been performed, the measurement will correspond to that
of the tampered enclave, and therefore it will pass all checks.
III. ATTACK SCENARIO
We consider a context where an attacker can gain access to
a machine where the signing material is generated for an SGX
enclave, as described in Section II. Frequently, this is executed
on the build server where the enclave is compiled. We assume
that the attacker is able to deploy a malware on such machine.
As referenced in the introduction this is a plausible scenario,
multiple similar cases being recorded in the recent period.
The malware will intercept the process that receives the
enclave binary as input and generates the signing material.
We further refer to this process as the signer process. The
malware will suspend the signer process and patch the enclave
with malicious code. Finally, the signer process is resumed.
The generated signing material will include the enclave mea-
surement computed over the tampered enclave. The effective
enclave signature will be applied on it as nothing abnormal
would have happened. Since the enclave integrity assurance
is based on the comparison between the signed measurement
and the actual loaded content, any further integrity checks on
the maliciously patched enclave will succeed.
Figure 2 depicts the usual chain for manufacturing an en-
clave and pinpoints where our malware attacks: after the binary
is produced by a compiler and before it is signed. Note that
the figure is representative for the single-step signing method,
where the signing material generation and the effective signing
are part of the same process, but the flow is similar for the
two-step method, with the difference that a separate process
performs the effective signing, as shown in Figure 1.
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Fig. 2. Attack flow architecture
The malware includes two components used for hijacking
and infecting the enclave manufacturing chain: the signer
monitor and the enclave patcher. The execution flow of the
two components is illustrated in Figure 3.
The signer monitor has the role of scanning the processes
that are currently running in the machine until it is able to
identify and suspend the signer process. To achieve that, it
uses heuristics such as the process name, input parameters,
memory occupancy, hash on certain memory chunks or digital
signature.
The enclave patcher is composed by malicious code and
instructions on where to inject this code. This depends on
the attacker’s knowledge about the enclave, ranging from very
specific changes on its behavior, like altering some remote
server endpoint address, to more generic approaches, like
exfiltrating as much information as it can. We exemplify in
the following section a use case where such a malicious patch
is hooked to the functions listed in the enclave’s ecall table,
leaks sensitive data out of the enclave and changes data within
the secure enclave space.
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Fig. 3. Malware operation
IV. USE CASE AND IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
We describe a practical use case about how an attacker could
profit from the window of opportunity detailed in Section III
for getting access to sensitive data and changing it. Concisely,
we inject code to learn about internal data structures and
monitor their content before being able to modify a piece of
sensitive data. Besides, we describe a data exfiltration patch.
SGX enclaves are accessed through an instruction called
EENTER that transfers the execution to a single entry point in
the protected area. The specific ecall routine address is then
fetched from a table to which we refer as ecall table. The
enclave patcher finds this table by a series of steps illustrated
in Figure 4. First, the enclave dynamic link library (DLL)
is disassembled with the aid of the BeaEngine library [10].
It is responsible for parsing and interpreting the portable
executable (PE) format in which the DLL is organized.
The enclave’s export data section contains a symbol called
enclave_entry, which is associated to its entry point
address (Ê). By following this address, we find a piece of
code that occasionally executes a call instruction to a given
address (Ë). When followed (Ì), this address leads to a chain
of other calls to pieces of code that are similar across different
enclaves. Eventually, the ecall table is consulted (Í). In all of
our enclave samples, the ecall table was located somewhere in
the read-only initialized data section (.rdata) of the DLL.
Once we find the table, a similar procedure happens to find the
ecall function implemented by the enclave developer (Î and
Ï), since the SGX software development kit (SDK) adds some
wrappers in order to perform security checks before calling the
actual enclave code. All these heuristics were obtained through
the analysis of several different enclaves generated by the SGX
SDK version 2.0.101.44281, until a set of patterns allowed us
to find the ecall table with certainty. Although this construction
may change across different SDK versions, the attacker could
apply a distinct set of heuristics depending on the version,
which is explicitly marked in the DLL’s metadata.
Once the enclave patcher finds the target ecall, it injects
a jump instruction in its beginning to a specially crafted
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Fig. 4. Steps to find ecall table
piece of code. We refer to it as the patch, whose address is
marked with the label HOOK. Besides the jump instruction
to the patch, we add a label (BACK) where the execution
continues after executing the hooked code. Figure 5 shows
on the left the initial state of the ecall table and the functions
it points to. In the bottom, we depict a set of disjoint chunks of
free memory within executable pages. They are found based
on their content, which can be contiguous areas containing
only zeros or ones, as these could not possibly refer to any
instruction codes. Such areas are used for placing the patch
code. Since there might not be a single chunk big enough
for holding the malicious code, the patcher may break it into
several pieces linked by jumps and labels. On the right side of
the figure, we illustrate the enclave after applying the patch.
The hooked code is split in two and connected by the label
H1.
As for the patch code, we first describe the exfiltration
example, depicted as the data leak patch in Figure 6. The
malicious code first tries to identify the arguments of the
ecall function by looking at the stack. It checks, among the
parameters, if there is an output buffer by evaluating if the
pointer refers to an untrusted piece of memory. In the figure,
this pointer is referred to as Ptr0 and it will be used by
the patch to leak sensitive data. The output buffer Ptr0 is
shown between two other arguments passed by value: Val0
and Val1, whose contents the attacker is interested in leaking
along with other local variables that happen to be in the stack.
In our prototype, the hook is injected in the beginning of the
ecall. One might argue that these values are not interesting for
exfiltration at this point, since they are the exact same as what
was given as parameter from the untrusted code and therefore
the attacker already knew them. Yet, placing the hook in the
end of the function would not be a good idea, since at this
point the ecall would have already written the output buffer
and it would not be possible to use it as the data leakage vector
anymore. So, the ideal placement is after some computation
on local variables has been done, but before the output buffer
is written. For simplicity, we chose to place the hook in the
beginning. We point out, however, that a more useful stack
data leakage attack would do it differently.
Once the control is diverted to the patch, it copies the stack
data to the output buffer. To confirm that the data leakage
has happened and facilitate the location of it, the patch also
prepends a marker in the output buffer, referred to as MALW
in Figure 6. To prevent that the output buffer be overwritten
when the ecall function is resumed, the patch also uses a spin
lock on a boolean variable in the output buffer before it gives
back the control to the ecall. Once the untrusted part reads the
leaked content, it changes the value of this variable and lets
the enclave execution go on. The leaked data is shown in the
first “hexdump chunk” of Figure 7, preceded by the marker.
Although this is an illustrative example, the same techniques
could be used for leaking session keys, server credentials or
actual payloads decrypted inside the enclave.
Our second experiment, instead of just leaking information,
also changes it. We used the remote attestation end-to-end
example [11] and the signing tool [12], both provided by
Intel. It basically performs all the necessary steps for remotely
attesting a server and establishes a session key. Our tampered
binaries passed undetected by all attestations, as expected.
We slightly modified the server by adding the transmission
of supposedly sensitive information encrypted with the ses-
sion key, the string "John;892157932877159;$100"
symbolizing, for instance, the destination of some financial
transaction.
The enclave patcher, in this case, includes the trampoline
to the patch in the end of the decryption function, so that
we can modify the information that arrived from the remote
server right after it was deciphered with the session key. The
two hexdump chunks of memory on the bottom of Figure 7
show the tampering, by replacing “John” for “Lary”. Note
that we write plaintext decrypted content in the output buffer
provided as a parameter of the ecall from the former example.
This happens to be untrusted memory area, accessible by the
attacker. In a real world application, any sensitive content must
only leave the protected memory in encrypted form. For the
sake of this experiment, however, we used untrusted memory
for being able to monitor the tampering when it happened.
In general, our approach is similar to any infection of
executable files, where malicious code is hooked on the exe-
cution flow and the injection is done in the free space within
the executable section. Nevertheless, we also consider some
specificities of SGX in our design, like analyzing the ecall
table, testing whether pointers belong to trusted or untrusted
memory areas and synchronizing with untrusted code through
PATCH 
                        .................FUNC_0 FUNC_1 FUNC_n
ECALL Table
push ebp 
mov ebp,esp 
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mov ebp,esp 
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Fig. 5. Enclave patcher
spin locks.
With regards to performance, we measured the time it takes
to sign the enclave with and without activating our malware.
Normal signing took on average 46.6 ms and 47.1 ms when
applying the malware. Both experiments were performed 100
times, with negligible standard deviation. All experiments
were conducted on a machine with an Intel Core i7-7700 CPU
at 3.60 GHz, with 16 GB of RAM and using Windows Server
2019.
V. MITIGATIONS AND DISCUSSION
Our attack happens entirely in user-mode and needs to strike
where the signing material is generated (see Section II). The
platform where the enclave binary was compiled or where
it will be signed are irrelevant to the attack’s accomplish-
ment. This is why our approach would succeed even with
the supposedly more secure two-step signing method [8],
where the private signing key is distinctively protected in
a different platform. Safely binding the binary produced by
a legit compiler with the signing material and the signing
process is precisely where mitigation actions should occur.
    SGX  
    Enclave
Libraries
Stack 
Heap
ECALL
function patch execution
ECALL function execution
data 
leak 
patch 
hook execution
Hook
Write(Ptr0, {"MALW", Stack[0:31]})
Process executing SGX Enclave
Val0
Ptr0
Val1 
ECALL Params
Spin lockTime for dump
Fig. 6. Exfiltrating enclave data
Indeed, the single-step signing method would always expose
the signing key to an attacker who has succeeded to inject a
malware in the signing platform. Instead of trying to tamper
with the enclave to be signed, attackers could just exfiltrate
the key and impersonate the ISV by launching any number
of rogue enclaves with genuine signature. Tampering with the
enclave, however, stealthily puts the patch inside the vendor’s
production code, and potentially gives access to sensitive data
more easily.
With regards to the malware’s privileges, we can consider
two possibilities: (i) it runs in user mode and any attempt to
manipulate other processes is blocked by memory protection
mechanisms; (ii) it can escalate to administrator super user,
load kernel modules and manipulate code and data of any
process.
In the first hypothesis, as a mitigation action, one could put
compilation and signing in the kernel. Input of sensitive data,
such as code and signing key, and output of signed material
could happen through any input/output device (flash drive,
network, etc.) and never reach user mode.
To mitigate the attack of one who has full control of the
OS, we can envision two possible solutions: (i) centralized,
using SGX protection; or (ii) distributed by relying on several
nodes and assuming that a majority is not compromised.
The centralized approach would put compilation and signing
inside dedicated SGX enclaves. This special enclave would
have been carefully crafted and accordingly signed by a
trusted party. Data provisioning (code and key) would be
performed through the typical SGX attestation and secret
provisioning (see Section V-A). SGX memory constraints
might seem to be a potential problem for the compilation
requirements. This can be addressed with appropriate software
caching management [13] or ordinary memory swapping. SGX
version 2 supports dynamic memory loading [14]. In any case,
compilation time is not the most concerning aspect for building
a secure application. As for the distributed approach, one could
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Fig. 7. Obtained data
resort to comparison and consensus [15], [16] on the enclave’s
hash, after each participant node had compiled its own copy of
the source code. This approach would require that the attacker
compromises a certain number of build servers, which is hard
to accomplish.
Exposing the attack, however, is easier. The attack can
always be detected if one compares the original untampered
enclave with the final tampered and signed one. When the
attacker leaves the original input binary untouched, such
comparison can be performed after the signature stage. For the
two-step signing method, on the other hand, the attacker must
replace the input with the tampered version, since the signature
comes later and it must match with the enclave binary, or
the measurement comparison would fail when launching it.
As a consequence, it is also possible to detect the attack at
the signing material generation step. It is therefore of utmost
importance to keep the original untampered file for successful
detection of the attack. Comparing the input file before and
after launching the signing tool is, however, arguably unusual,
and only likely to be performed by the awareness of attacks
such as ours. In conclusion, facility of exposure does not
nullify the necessity to enhance supply chain security.
A. SGX compilation and signing
We further investigate the centralized mitigation approach
described above by designing, implementing and measuring
the performance of a combined compiler and signer within
SGX enclaves. Such method would guarantee that the enclave
signature corresponds to that of the binary generated by an
accredited compiler even if the signing machine is compro-
mised by a super user who has full control of the operating
system. We assume, however, that the source code and private
key were safely provided through encrypted channels after an
attestation (see Section II) performed by the ISV, as illustrated
in Figure 8. Once the enclave is attested and the secure
communication channel is established (Ê), the ISV provides
the source code it intends to compile and sign (Ë). The
compiler embedded in the enclave then generates the binary
and provides it to the signer (Ì), which also resides in the
secure environment. This, in turn, computes the signature of
ISV
Source
Code
Private key
Build server
SGX Enclave
Compiler
Signer
010101010110
111001101001
011011100111011
001100101011100
1  .          1
0             0
001110101001001
000000110010001
100101001000000
Enclave
Attestation
Encrypted channel
➊
➋
➌
➍
➎
Fig. 8. SGX compilation and signing
the generated binary using the private key provisioned by the
ISV (Í), to whom it finally sends the final signed enclave (Î).
We chose the tiny C compiler (TCC) [17] for turning source
code into an executable image. TCC provides support for cross
compiling Windows MZPE files (.exe applications and .dll
dynamic libraries) and Linux extensible linking format (ELF)
files (a.out executables and .so shared objects) for x86,
x64 and ARM architectures. As in our previous experiments,
we used Windows x64 as build target. Figure 9 portrays the
data flow along with the adaptations we carried out. In order
to support the compilation of legacy code, we had to ship
with the enclave some common dependencies, such as standard
libraries, headers and the common runtime (CRT). In spite
of this, the final enclave size, including compiler and signer,
accounted for only 2.14 MiB out of the 93.5 MiB of usable
enclave page cache (EPC) memory [18].
The signer, depicted in Figure 10, receives the compiler
output and the signing private key. We implemented the
signature using crypto libraries available in the SGX SDK
(sgx tcrypto and sgx ippcp). Particularly, secure hash algo-
rithm 256-bit (SHA-256), and RSA 3072 bits (public exponent
equal to 3), as specified by Intel [19]. The signature (encrypted
hash) is then appended to the enclave binary along with the
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TCC Compiler
MZPE Buffer
ecall
… …
stdio.h
windows.h
crt1.c
wincrt1.c
stdlib.h chkstk.S
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SignerSignedMZPE Buffer
ocall
Fig. 9. TCC Compiler within an enclave
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ecall Signer
ocall
MZPE Buffer EncryptedHash
Public key
Fig. 10. Signer
corresponding public key. This bundle is then sent back to the
ISV.
The system setup for measuring the compilation and signa-
ture durations is a machine equipped with an Intel processor
i7-8650U at 1.90 GHz, with 16 GB of RAM and using Win-
dows 10 Professional x64 build 1803. We tested our mitigation
approach on 5 samples of C source code of different sizes.
Table I provides a brief description of these samples. We
compiled and signed the corresponding binaries both within
a secured SGX enclave using the setup described above, as
well as simulating the normal native enclave building steps,
outside the secured enclave, in order to observe any potential
downgrade in performance. Results are shown in Figure 11.
Each experiment was repeated 11 times and averaged. Error
bars correspond to the 95% confidence interval.
We can notice that even if compilation times take longer
inside the enclave for most samples, the total time is either
equivalent or smaller than natively doing the same. The main
reason resides in a significant difference between our inside
enclave implementation and the outside one. The outside
version writes the binary on disk and reads it back for the
signing step. Our SGX version, on the other hand, uses a
memory buffer. Besides, the signing tool provided by Intel
performs additional checks on the input file. Since in our
experiments the compilation output never leaves the enclave,
these checks are obviated.
In large projects, we can assume the whole EPC memory
TABLE I
SOURCE CODES USED IN THE BENCHMARK
Program LoC Description
hello 5 Simply prints a message
fibonacci 25 Computes the nth fibonacci number
solitaire 418 Console version of peg solitaire puzzle
lisp 1,439 Lisp interpreter
malware 27,676 Malware described in Section IV
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Fig. 11. Compilation and signing duration when varying source code sizes
could be exhausted, in which case we expect that the perfor-
mance would degrade dramatically due to memory paging [20]
or the necessity of writing temporary files on disk (in such
case, the SGX sealing mechanisms should be used). Never-
theless, the trade-off between compilation time and security
would arguably favor the latter. We leave this evaluation to
future work.
VI. RELATED WORK
There is currently very limited published research specifi-
cally addressing malware attacks on SGX, and to our knowl-
edge none addressing the context we refer to in our work. The
research presented in [21] is probably the closest approach
to a malware targeting the supply chain infrastructure. The
situation considered is of a malware code payload that is
encrypted, downloaded, decrypted and executed in a secure
enclave that was previously attested as legit. To initiate this
sequence of steps, the attacker requires a remote bootstrap
program that is used to build the initial enclave, attest it, and
facilitate the exchange of keys with the attacker for encrypting
the malware code. The decrypted malware code running inside
the enclave can subsequently receive other instructions or input
from the attacker. A use case also discusses the possibility,
in the same manner, to also execute stalling code inside the
enclave. Such code is not malicious per se, but it is typically
executed before the malware and used for hiding the following
malicious behavior from analysis tools.
Most of the documented attacks that target SGX rely on
cache exploits. In [22], the authors assume the inclusion of
malware in a malicious enclave co-located with a victim
enclave. The malware performs a Prime+Probe cache side-
channel attack through which it is able to recover RSA keys
used in the victim enclave. The attacker uses the API provided
by the victim to trigger signature computation and has to locate
the victim’s cache sets that contain the secret-dependent data
of the leaked key. The primary purpose of hiding the malware
inside an enclave is to conceal the malicious code, leveraging
the SGX protection features to avoid detection. However, the
attack does not target effectively infecting or corrupting the
enclave where the malware resides, which is our case.
Another work [23] also profits from SGX isolation to
stealthily operate by leveraging Intel’s transactional synchro-
nization extensions (TSX) memory-disclosure primitive. They
show how to effectively bypass the host application interface
and execute arbitrary system calls via return-oriented pro-
gramming (ROP), without collaboration from untrusted code.
Different from us, they do not target sensitive data operated
by enclaves, but rather at hijacking the infected machine for
subverted uses.
The authors of [24] present another attack on SGX that
develops on the Prime+Probe technique of recovering infor-
mation from the cache, such as an RSA key. In this case
the attack isolates the core used by the victim enclave from
other processes to minimize the noise in the side channel.
Another improvement of the attack is uninterrupted execution
by configuring the interrupt controller to not deliver interrupts
to the attack core. If it is allowed on this core to receive inter-
rupts, this could be used to deflect side channel attacks. The
attack also relies on Intel performance monitoring counters
(PMC) for monitoring cache evictions and also monitors the
frequency in order to not miss victim accesses to the cache.
In [25], the authors also describe an attack that uses CPU
pinning and Intel PMC in a Prime+Probe approach. The attack
retrieves cache information that leads to an AES key leak. For
using these mechanisms the above attacks assume full control
over the operating system where the victim enclave is run.
In comparison, the attack in our scenario could be executed
also under more restrictive conditions, but again the context is
different since the referenced attacks do not effectively attempt
to corrupt an enclave.
The recent Foreshadow attack [26] again targets CPU cache
leaks, but adopts a different mechanism exploiting a specula-
tive execution bug. This consists in an unauthorized memory
access in transient out-of-order instructions, which can be used
before rollback to retrieve confidential data, in a similar man-
ner to the Meltdown attack [27]. Another recently-published
side-channel attack [28] exploits contention on simultaneous
multithreading (SMT) and code-reuse. They demonstrate their
attack by finding gadgets from glibc to execute code that
ultimately leak plaintext data from OpenSSL.
In [29], the authors describe an attack that violates the
enclave integrity with the purpose of triggering a processor
lockdown. The attack relies on the Rowhammer approach for
flipping bits in the EPC memory region, which leads to the
DoS effect. This is achieved by executing a code snippet inside
the enclave that has to find conflicting row addresses in the
same memory bank of the EPC, which is required to run
the Rowhammer routine. The code snippet is supposed to be
executed inside a malicious enclave that will be downloaded
on a victim machine. Our attack scenario opens the possibility
to corrupt legit enclaves with custom malicious code, which
could also be such DoS triggering routines injected during the
signing process, before attestation.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have presented a novel attack in the area of supply chain
malware, with a specific target on protection measures that
involve the use of SGX. We provided a practical use case for
our attack methodology, which is able to successfully extract
sensitive data from the secure enclave space. This use case is
generic enough to be applied to multiple cases of enclaves.
A malicious entity who has knowledge of a particular enclave
functionality can leverage the attack scenario for more specific
attacks that can be even more disabling, e.g., changing some
particular behavior of the enclave code. The flexibility of
the attack scenario, which requires essentially just a window
of opportunity between the building and the signing of an
enclave, makes it quite problematic.
Fortunately, some basic mitigation mechanisms are rela-
tively easy to enforce, as discussed in Section V. We have
shown that protection via compiling and securely signing the
binary within a dedicated SGX enclave is a feasible practical
option. Also, we believe some other more advanced mitigation
options involving cryptographic techniques, such as verifiable
secret sharing, could be explored. It is debatable, however,
how well these schemes would perform in practice. As future
work, we consider evaluating and comparing such mitigation
mechanisms.
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